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Therefore, generics are seen as a major po-
licy option for cost-containment since, due to 
their lower prices, they benefit the health care 
systems by providing savings which might be 
used for funding innovation. An international 
study covering 17 countries worldwide found 
out that cost savings of more than 50 percent 
could be generated in all but two of 17 stu-
died countries surveyed if consumption shif-
ted from the originator brand product to the 
lowest-priced generic equivalent available 
at medicine outlets in the private sector [3]. 
A study on generic policies on seven OECD 
countries (European countries, US, Canada) 
published in 2008 estimated that significant 
additional savings to health insurances of up 
INTRODUCTION
A generic medicine is a pharmaceutical 
product which has the same qualitative and 
quantitative composition in active substan-
ces and the same pharmaceutical form as 
the reference original medicine, and whose 
bioequivalence with the reference medicine 
has been demonstrated by appropriate bioa-
vailability studies [1]. Generics are launched 
when the patent of the originator product has 
expired. Whereas the quality of generics is 
with no difference to the one of original pro-
ducts, they tend to be cheaper: the European 
Generics Medicines Association indicates 
generic prices being 20 to 90 percent lower 
than those of original medicines [2].
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OBJECTIVE: To survey the price differences between originators and generics for a selected basket of molecules and to 
analyze similarities and differences with regard to the countries included and their generic policies. METHODS: Ex-factory 
prices as of November 2011 of five molecules provided from the Pharma Price Information (PPI) service of the Austrian 
Health Institute were analyzed for 16 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, UK). The selected molecules were gemcita-
bine, mycophenolate mofetil, olanzapine, risperidone and sumatriptan. For a specific presentation (same pack size, dosage 
and pharmaceutical form) of each molecule, the prices of the original product and the “most common generic” as defined 
by PPI were compared. RESULTS: Considerable variations among the extent of price differences between originator and 
generic were identified (gemicitabine: lowest price difference of 1.4% between originator and generic in Belgium and hi-
ghest difference of 73.4% in Portugal; mycophenolate mofetil: 3.4% Norway – 71.7% Netherlands; olanzapine: 0.1% Spain 
– 97.1% Sweden; risperidone: 0.9% Netherlands – 97.3% UK; sumatriptan: 5.8% Greece – 95.0% Denmark). Further, no 
difference at all between originator and generic prices was found for some molecules in a few countries (Norway: for 4 
of the 5 molecules analyzed; Spain: 3; Belgium: 2; in Austria, France and Greece for one molecule respectively). For the 
five molecules of the sample, Greece, Spain, Ireland and Norway consistently displayed lower price differences whereas 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden tended to show higher differences between originator and generic prices. CONCLUSION: 
Even if this research is illustrative and not representative due to the small sample size, results suggest confirming large dif-
ferences across Europe. It appears that countries (e.g. Denmark, Sweden) with strong generic policies, particularly based on 
competition and involving elements of enforcement, tend to have higher differences between originator and generic prices. 
Further research, notably with a broader basket, is recommended.
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to 43% of current generic sales could be rea-
lized if generic purchasing and genericisation 
improved further [4]. For Europe, while the 
European Generics Medicines Association 
estimated overall savings for EU patients and 
health care systems of over 25 billion Euro 
each year [5]; further data were provided by 
studies analyzing the impact of specific poli-
cies: An Austrian study as of 2008 estimated 
yearly savings for the social health insurance 
of up to 55 million Euro in case of the im-
plementation of a reference price system (i.e. 
reimbursement of a defined amount for iden-
tical or similar products in a cluster) and ge-
neric substitution (i.e. the pharmacist dispen-
sing a generic instead of the prescribed brand 
original product); these savings would corre-
spond to ten percent of total pharmaceutical 
expenditure in Austria [6]. Another study 
assessed the reductions in public expenditure 
on original products due to generic substitu-
tion as of 20 to 50 percent for selected Euro-
pean countries [7]. Following patent expiries 
in recent years and expected further expiri-
es [8] future savings can be expected to be 
considerably higher than estimated in these 
studies performed some years ago.
Due to the potential of generics for patients 
and health systems to achieve equivalent he-
alth outcomes at a lower cost, measures to 
promote generics uptake have been imple-
mented by several European countries: they 
include both supply-side measures such as a 
linkage of pricing and/or reimbursement de-
cisions on generics to the originator medici-
nes, tendering mechanisms and accelerated 
procedures regarding pricing and/or reimbur-
sement decisions and demand-side measures 
such as prescribing by the International Non-
Proprietary Name (INN), monitoring prescri-
bing behaviour, pharmaceutical budgets and 
generics substitution [9-14]. Reference price 
systems accompanied by either INN prescri-
bing or generic prescribing tend to be com-
mon instruments to promote generics uptake 
(18 of the European Union Member States); 
only one EU Member State (Austria) imple-
mented none of these three measures [15]. At 
the supply side, the “generic price link”, i.e. 
setting the price of a generic medicine at a 
specific rate below the originator price, is also 
a common feature in shaping generic policies 
[9,13,15]. In current economically difficult 
times, generic policies are considered as a 
policy option to further develop even though 
they are not – such as price reductions and 
co-payments – the top emergency measures 
in response to the global financial crisis [16].
Generic medicines prices have been surveyed 
and analyzed in international price compari-
sons, both at global and European level [17-
21]. The extent of the differences between the 
prices of generics and original medicines was 
surveyed in fewer studies. One important 
report in this respect is the Pharmaceutical 
Sector Inquiry 2009 of the European Com-
mission: it showed that in 17 EU Member 
States generics enter the market at on average 
a price slightly under 80% of the originator’s 
price. After three years the prices of both the 
originator and the generics dropped on avera-
ge to about 75% and 55% respectively of the 
originator’s price at generic entry [22]. The 
study design of the Pharmaceutical Sector In-
quiry, an analysis of relative prices, was chal-
lenged, and concern was expressed that the 
reasons for the variability and the potential 
role and interplay of regulation and compe-
tition were not sufficiently investigated [23].
This study particularly aims to survey the 
extent of the price differences between gene-
ric and original medicines and compare them 
across European countries. Price differences 
for a basket of selected molecules among Eu-
ropean countries are analyzed, and a possible 
relationship to the generic prices, generics 
market shares and generic policies will be 
explored.
METHODS
A basket of five molecules whose patent had 
already expired was selected for the analysis. 
The selected medicines are applied in dif-
ferent indications. Included in the analysis 
were: gemcitabine (an anti-neoplatic agent), 
mycophenolate mofetil (immunosuppres-
sant), olanzapine (anti-depressant), risperi-
done (anti-psychotic) and sumatriptan (anal-
getic).
The price survey and analysis was underta-
ken for 16 European countries, some of them 
being major pharmaceutical markets: Au-
stria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, 
Sweden, and the UK.
Data were provided by the Pharma Price 
Information (PPI) service of the Austrian 
Health Institute [24]. The PPI service is an 
information service which offers medicine 
prices of the EU Member States covering all 
price types. It was established to support, ac-
cording the Austrian General Social Insuran-
ce Law [25], the Austrian Pricing Commit-
tee located at the Austrian Federal Ministry 
of Health which calculates the EU average 
price which is needed for price setting sin-
ce Austria applies external price referencing 
and sets its prices based on the average prices 
of the prices in all other EU Member States 
[26]. Data of the PPI service are provided 
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at request to all interested parties and might 
also be requested for research.
Prices were analyzed at the ex-factory price 
level, since the issue of distribution margins 
was not scope of this study. Data were pro-
vided as of November 2011. Price data from 
non-Euro countries were converted into Euro 
based on the monthly exchange rate of the 
European Central Bank as of November 2011.
A pair of a specific original product and an 
identical generic was subject to the analysis, 
thus comparing presentations in the same 
pack size, dosage and pharmaceutical form. 
In determining the identical presentation the 
author was guided by the Defined Daily Do-
sis (DDD) as stipulated by the WHO Colla-
borating Centre for Drug Statistics Methodo-
logy in Oslo, and checked a larger PPI data 
set to identify pairs of originator and generic 
medicines available in several countries.
For some of the selected presentations, gene-
rics from more than one supplier were offered 
– sometimes, but not always – with the same 
price. Included into the analysis were those 
generics which the PPI service had defined as 
the “most common generic”. Suppliers of the 
most common generic might differ among 
the countries.
Prices and price differences were analyzed 
at unit price level. The prices were calcula-
ted per DDD because for the given research 
question a unit price analysis served better 
the purpose to understand pricing strategies. 
Furthermore, two of the molecules selected 
had no DDD allocated due to their highly 
individualized use, and applying count-
ry specific DDDs would have distorted the 
analysis.
In some cases data on the original product 
and the corresponding generic in the defined 
presentation were not available because pro-
ducts, usually the generic versions, were not 
marketed in these pack sizes, dosages and/or 
pharmaceutical forms. In order to achieve 
high data coverage, the following exemptions 
for the pairs analyzed were accepted: diffe-
rent but similar pack sizes (e.g. 30 units inste-
ad of 28 units) were included in the analysis. 
Deviations to the pharmaceutical form were 
rarely permitted, only in the case of film-coa-
ted tablets, tablets and capsules. Similar 
strengths (e.g. 6 mg instead of 4 mg) were 
accepted in very few cases. While these va-
riances were allowed among the countries 
analyzed, the pair of an original product and 
its comparable generic per country needed to 
have the identical pack size, dosage and phar-
maceutical form (one exemption: olanzapine, 
the Netherlands). Despite these exemptions 
data had to be excluded in some countries be-
cause no generic corresponding to the origi-
nator was on the market.
Table I provides an overview about the five 
analyzed molecules including methodologi-
Molecule Indication
Defined daily 
dose (DDD)*
Selected 
presentation
Comments
Gemcitabine Breast cancer, 
anti‑neoplastic 
agent
No DDD defined 1 vial containing 
1 g powder 
for solution for 
infusion
Comparable data available for 12 countries. 
No price comparison possible in DE, ES, IE, 
SE due to missing generics in a comparable 
presentation
Mypcophenolate 
mofetil
Immunosuppressant No DDD defined 100 caps 250 mg Comparable data available for 16 countries. AT: 
different pack size and dosage (150 500 mg f/c 
tabs), BE, CH, DK: 300 units, but same dosage 
and pharmaceutical form
Olanzapine Schizophrenia, 
anti‑depressant
10 mg 28 f/c tabs 10 mg Comparable data available for 13 countries. 
No price comparison possible in CH, DE, 
DK due to missing generics in a comparable 
presentation. NL: data adjusted at unit level – 
30 units/pack for original product, 28 units/pack 
for generic, NO: different pharmaceutical form: 
orodispersible tabs, SE: 56 units, same dosage 
and pharmaceutical form
Risperidone Schizophrenia, 
anti‑psychotic
5 mg 60 f/c tabs 4 mg Comparable data available for 16 countries
Sumatriptan Migraine, analgetic, 
SS antagonist
50 mg (oral) 6 f/c tabs 50 g Comparable data available for 11 countries. 
No price comparison possible in AT, FI, FR, IT, 
SE due to missing generics in a comparable 
presentation ES and EL: 4 units, PT: 2 units, 
same pack size and pharmaceutical form; BE: 
100 mg f/c tabs
Table I. Molecules analyzed and limitations regarding comparability* as defined by the WHO Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics 
Methodology, Oslo [27]
AT = Austria; BE = Belgium; CH = Switzerland; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; EL = Greece; ES = Spain; FI = Finland; IE = Ireland; IT = Italy;  
NO = Norway; SE = Sweden
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mycophenolate mofetil: 3 countries, olanza-
pine: 1 country, risperidone: 4 countries, su-
matriptan: 2 countries) (Figure 1).
Expressed in absolute figures, the prices per 
pack of generics were lower as of € 134.77 
(Denmark) to € 0.85 (Belgium) for gemici-
tabine (no price difference in France, Gree-
ce and Norway); of € 190.73 (Switzerland) 
to € 1.72 (Norway) for mycophenolate mo-
fetil (no difference in Austria, Belgium and 
Spain); of € 77.49 (Finland) to € 0.04 (Spain) 
for olanzapine (no difference in Norway); of 
€ 95.35 (United Kingdom) to € 0.82 (Italy) 
for risperidone (no difference in Belgium, 
Ireland, Norway and Spain); and of € 45.04 
(Belgium) to € 0.39 (Greece) for sumatriptan 
(no difference in Norway and Spain).
Since the unit prices for the medicines 
analyzed were, apart for gemicitabine, usual-
ly less than four Euro, the unit price diffe-
rences in Euro were accordingly low. Figure 
2 explored the possible relationship between 
the extent of the price differences and generic 
price. Some limited pattern is visible in a few 
countries: for instance, Norway and, to some 
extent also Ireland, tended to have compara-
bly higher prices and low or even no price 
differences between the originator and the 
generic. At the other end, Sweden, Finland 
and Denmark ranked low regarding generic 
prices of the studied medicines but had, as 
a trend, differences of more than 70%, and 
sometimes 90%, between the originator and 
the generic prices. A similar picture was seen 
in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, 
however in a less consistent way than in the 
three Nordic countries.
No correlation was found between the extent 
of the price difference and the relevance of 
the generics market, expressed in the out-
patient generics market share in volume (Fi-
gure 3). While countries with an advanced 
generics market such as Finland and Sweden 
displayed in some cases higher price diffe-
rences, this is not the case for Germany and 
Norway. On the other hand, Portugal, with a 
rather lower generics market share, displayed 
price differences of some relevance.
Table II provides an overview of the “classi-
cal” policy measures with regard to generic 
promotion for the countries analyzed which 
were clustered into ones with apparently high 
and low price differences. All three countri-
es with high price differences (Denmark, 
Sweden and Finland) did not link the prices 
of generics to the ones of originators, whi-
le the countries identified to have low or no 
price differences (Belgium, Greece, Norway, 
Spain) did so. Countries with high price dif-
ferences tended to have generic substitution 
introduced on a mandatory basis.
Figure 1. Price differences (expressed as the percentage which the price of the generic is lower than the one of the originator) between 
identical presentations of the originator and generic for five molecules in 16 European countries, data as of November 2011
AT = Austria; BE = Belgium; CH = Switzerland; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; EL = Greece; ES = Spain; FI = Finland; FR = France; IE = Ireland; IT = 
Italy; NL = the Netherlands; NO = Norway; PT = Portugal; SE =Sweden; UK = United Kingdom
is cheaper than the original product. A pos-
sible correlation between the generics mar-
ket and generic policies respectively and the 
extent of the price differences was investiga-
cal comments on the selected presentations 
for the analysis.
Price differences were defined and calculated 
as the percentage which the generic medicine 
33Farmeconomia. Health economics and therapeutic pathways 2012; 13(Suppl 3) © SEEd All rights reserved
S. Vogler
mycophenolate mofetil: 3 countries, olanza-
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to € 1.72 (Norway) for mycophenolate mo-
fetil (no difference in Austria, Belgium and 
Spain); of € 77.49 (Finland) to € 0.04 (Spain) 
for olanzapine (no difference in Norway); of 
€ 95.35 (United Kingdom) to € 0.82 (Italy) 
for risperidone (no difference in Belgium, 
Ireland, Norway and Spain); and of € 45.04 
(Belgium) to € 0.39 (Greece) for sumatriptan 
(no difference in Norway and Spain).
Since the unit prices for the medicines 
analyzed were, apart for gemicitabine, usual-
ly less than four Euro, the unit price diffe-
rences in Euro were accordingly low. Figure 
2 explored the possible relationship between 
the extent of the price differences and generic 
price. Some limited pattern is visible in a few 
countries: for instance, Norway and, to some 
extent also Ireland, tended to have compara-
bly higher prices and low or even no price 
differences between the originator and the 
generic. At the other end, Sweden, Finland 
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in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, 
however in a less consistent way than in the 
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displayed in some cases higher price diffe-
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rather lower generics market share, displayed 
price differences of some relevance.
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cal” policy measures with regard to generic 
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were clustered into ones with apparently high 
and low price differences. All three countri-
es with high price differences (Denmark, 
Sweden and Finland) did not link the prices 
of generics to the ones of originators, whi-
le the countries identified to have low or no 
price differences (Belgium, Greece, Norway, 
Spain) did so. Countries with high price dif-
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Figure 1. Price differences (expressed as the percentage which the price of the generic is lower than the one of the originator) between 
identical presentations of the originator and generic for five molecules in 16 European countries, data as of November 2011
AT = Austria; BE = Belgium; CH = Switzerland; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; EL = Greece; ES = Spain; FI = Finland; FR = France; IE = Ireland; IT = 
Italy; NL = the Netherlands; NO = Norway; PT = Portugal; SE =Sweden; UK = United Kingdom
ted. Information about generic policies and 
the generics market was provided by PPRI 
(Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimbursement 
Information) network members. PPRI is a 
networking and information-sharing initia-
tive on pharmaceutical policies from a pu-
blic health perspective which emerged from 
a European Commission co-funded project 
under the same name [28,29]. As in June 
2012, PPRI consisted of nearly 70 institu-
tions, mainly Medicines Agencies, Ministries 
of Health and Social Insurance institutions, 
from 40 countries, including all 27 EU Mem-
ber States, plus European and international 
institutions (European Commission servi-
ces and agencies, OECD, WHO and World 
Bank). PPRI network members provide on 
a regular basis information and data about 
pharmaceutical policy measures and outco-
me indicators to the PPRI secretariat which 
collects and manages these data in the so-
called PHIS (Pharmaceutical Health Infor-
mation System) database [30]. Though the 
indicators are published in an annually upda-
ted version in the Internet, for this manuscript 
the internal version of the PHIS database was 
consulted in order to obtain, wherever pos-
sible, information and data as of November 
2011. While the quality as well as coverage 
of data on policy measures are accurate due 
to regular contact and requests to the PPRI 
members, the data quality regarding the ge-
nerics market shares is limited since autho-
rities in some countries do not have exact 
and up-to-date data. The author therefore 
validated these data by consulting published 
data from the European Generics Association 
(EGA) which refer to the market shares as of 
2006 [31]. Apart from Finland (low generics 
market share in the EGA data) no major in-
consistency was detected.
RESULTS
The price differences between the originator 
and the equivalent generic medicine of the 
five selected molecules varied among the fif-
teen countries: from 1.4% (Belgium) to 
73.4% (Portugal) for gemicitabine (compara-
ble data available for 12 countries), from 
3.4% (Norway) to 71.7% (the Netherlands) 
for mycophenolate mofetil (16 countries), 
from 0.1% (Spain) to 97.1% (Sweden) for 
olanzapine (13 countries), 0.9% (the Nether-
lands) to 97.3% (UK) for risperidone (16 
countries) and from 5.8% (Greece) to 95.0% 
(Denmark) for sumatriptan (11 countries). 
Additionally, for all five molecules analyzed 
there was at least one country where the price 
of the generic was identical to the one of the 
original product (gemicitabine: 3 countries, 
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Figure 2. Price differences (expressed as the percentage which the price of the generic is lower than the one of the originator) between 
identical presentations of the originator and generic and the prices of the generic medicine per unit for five molecules in 16 European 
countries, data as of November 2011
AT = Austria; BE = Belgium; CH = Switzerland; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; EL = Greece; ES = Spain; FI = Finland; FR = France; IE = Ireland; IT = 
Italy; NL = the Netherlands; NO = Norway; PT = Portugal; SE =Sweden; UK = United Kingdom
Figure 3. Price difference (expressed as the percentage which the price of the generic is lower than the one of the originator, price 
data as of November 2011) between identical presentations of the originator and generic for five molecules and generics market 
shares* in 16 European countries
* generics market share in volume in the out‑patient sector. No data available for CH, EL, IE. Note on generics market shares: 2004 = IT, 2005 = DE, 
2006 = SE, 2007 = AT, NO; 2008 = FI, 2010 = BE; out‑patient reimbursed sector = ES
AT = Austria; BE = Belgium; CH = Switzerland; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; EL = Greece; ES = Spain; FI = Finland; FR = France; IE = Ireland; 
IT = Italy; NL = the Netherlands; NO = Norway; PT = Portugal; SE =Sweden; UK = United Kingdom
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possible role of prescribers and pharmacists 
in enhancing generics uptake were not suffi-
ciently considered [32]. In Spain, generic po-
licies are seen as an important policy option, 
and the country introduced some changes 
with the summer 2011 reform package which 
included speeding up of the establishment of 
reference groups in the reference price sy-
stem, a change in the methodology in generic 
substitution allowing a broader use and ma-
king INN prescribing mandatory [33]. Gree-
ce has been criticized for long – not only for 
the missing implementation of a consistent 
generic promotion policy but also, in general, 
for the lack of a sustainable health care and 
pharmaceutical policy [34-36].
It is a rather surprising result that Norway 
showed no price difference for four of the five 
molecules and only a minor one for the fifth. 
This also contradicted evidence about the 
country’s low generic prices resulting from 
its active generic policies. Norway has been 
promoting generics primarily via the “stepped 
price model” (Trinnprismodellen) which pro-
vides incremental price decreases according 
to pre-defined rates, depending on sales volu-
DISCUSSION
Despite of the limitation of a rather small 
basket of molecules analyzed, some pattern 
among the studied countries can be observed. 
Some countries had consistently no or little 
price differences between the originator and 
the generic product, while others displayed 
price differences ranging from 50 to up to ne-
arly 100 percent for the molecules analyzed: 
Belgium, Greece, Norway and Spain ranked 
at the lower end for most of the molecules 
analyzed. There appears to be a need for im-
proved generic promotion in Belgium, Gree-
ce and Spain since generics market shares are 
rather low (Figure 3). While policy measures 
to promote generics uptake are in place in 
these countries (Table II), they have appa-
rently not been fully exploited: for instance, 
generic substitution and/or INN promotion 
have been implemented on an indicative ba-
sis and not in a mandatory way, and the per-
centage rate defined in the generic price link 
policy appears comparably low. In Belgium, 
while the reference price system has stimu-
lated the generics market and has led to a re-
duction of the originator prices as well, the 
Country Generic price link Reference price system Generic substitution INN prescribing
Countries with high price differences between originator and generic
Denmark No RPS at ATC 5 Yes, mandatory Yes, indicative
Finland No RPS at ATC 5 Yes, mandatory Yes, indicative
Sweden No No Yes, mandatory Not allowed
Countries with moderate price differences between originator and generic 
and/or no clear picture for the studied molecules
Austria Yes No Not allowed Not allowed
Germany No RPS with broad clusters Yes, mandatory Yes, indicative
France Yes RPS at ATC 5 Yes, indicative Yes, indicative
Ireland Yes No Not allowed Yes, indicative
Italy Yes RPS at ATC 5 Yes, indicative Yes, indicative
Netherlands No RPS with broad clusters Yes, indicative Yes, indicative
Portugal Yes RPS at ATC 5 Yes, indicative Yes, mandatory
Switzerland N.a. No Yes, indicative No
United Kingdom No No Not allowed Yes, indicative and 
highly encouraged
Countries with low price differences between originator and generic
Belgium Yes RPS at ATC 5 Not allowed* Yes, indicative
Greece Yes PRS at ATC 5 Not allowed Yes, indicative
Norway Yes RPS at ATC 5 Yes, indicative Yes, indicative
Spain Yes RPS at ATC 5 Yes, indicative Yes, mandatory
Table II. Generic policy measures in the countries analyzed, clustered with regard to their extent of differences between originator 
and generic prices, as in November 2011
* Not allowed at the time to which the prices refer to (November 2011). Since 1 April 2012, every prescription of an antibiotic or antifungal medicine is 
regarded as a prescription by INN and the pharmacist is obliged to dispense the lowest priced medicine
ATC = Anatomic Therapeutic Chemical classification system by WHO; ATC 5 = defines a single active ingredient or a fixed combination of active 
ingredients within the ATC classification system, i.e. RPS is based on the same active ingredients; INN = International Non‑Proprietary Name; 
RPS = Reference Price System
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ted in an indicative way in most European 
countries (see Table II), in recent times some 
countries decided on a policy change by ma-
king INN prescribing mandatory, generally 
or at least for some products (e.g. Lithuania 
in June 2010, Spain in August 2011, Slovakia 
in December 2011 and recently Hungary for 
statins in April 2012). Finland introduced a 
reference price system in 2009 – this was at 
a time when many other European countries 
already had one. Even before the implemen-
tation of the reference price system, Finland 
had an advanced generics market and could 
generate savings from generics. This was at-
tributable to generic substitution which trig-
gered price competition [40]. The reference 
price system further enhanced generic com-
petition and drove prices down [41].
The picture on the Netherlands and the UK is 
far less clear because high price differences 
were displayed for some molecules whereas 
the differences were moderate and even low 
for others (Figure 1). Both the Netherlands 
and the UK have a strong generics market 
(Figure 3), and they have been promoting 
generics for a long time though they chose 
different approaches. The Netherlands intro-
duced a reference price system in the early 
1990s and an electronic system to convert 
brand prescriptions into INN prescriptions 
and awarded for years (till 2004) a financial 
incentive to pharmacists in return for generic 
substitution [6,7,10,42]. During the last years 
the so-called preference price policy for se-
lected molecules has been applied. The Dutch 
preference price policy is, like in Denmark, a 
tendering procedure in the out-patient sector 
[43]. With this policy health insurance com-
panies determine one or a limited number 
of medicine(s) per cluster (medicines with 
the same active ingredient, dosage form and 
strength) as preferred, each time for a fixed 
period of usually six months. The preferred 
medicine winning the tender will be reimbur-
sed [44]. In terms of savings the preference 
price policy was considered as very suc-
cessful; initial total savings (projected to € 
355 million annually) exceeded expectations 
since the preference policy scheme resulted 
in fierce price competition among generic 
companies [45]. From the molecules studied 
in this analysis, olanzapine, risperidone and 
sumatriptan typically fall under the preferen-
ce price policy [46]. For these products, the 
differences between originator and generic 
prices are often quite low, and generic prices 
are also at a low level (Figure 2). Apparently 
price competition involved not only the ge-
nerics under the preference price system but 
also the originator, and data suggest confir-
ming analyses which highlight considerable 
mes. The first reduction occurs after a medici-
ne has lost patent protection [37]. The “step-
ped price model” was considered accountable 
for increasing the generics market shares and 
lowering generic prices [37,38]. The hypo-
thesis that the non-existing or low price diffe-
rences might be a result from already existing 
low generic prices, as a study about the ove-
rall market suggests [21], could not be con-
firmed for the molecules of this analysis: the 
prices of the selected generics usually ranked 
in the upper field (Figure 2). While further re-
search on this issue is, in general, encouraged, 
it would be particularly of interest to study in 
further depth generics prices in Norway.
The other Nordic states Sweden, Denmark 
and also Finland were among those countries 
showing the highest price differences betwe-
en the originator and an equivalent presen-
tation of the generic medicine. Generic mar-
kets in these countries are advanced (Figure 
3), and generic policies are predominantly 
based on competition. Denmark is one of 
the few European countries which applies 
tendering procedures in the out-patient sec-
tor: every two weeks, the reference product 
(i.e. the one reimbursed) under the referen-
ce price system is tendered for, and only the 
“winner” will be reimbursed [6,39]. While 
the high frequency of the change certainly 
implies logistical challenges, in particular 
for pharmacies – and initial problems indeed 
occurred leading to shortages resulting in the 
National Health Service having to pay for 
higher priced available medicines [6] –, the 
tendering system creates a highly competi-
tive market environment. As one of the first 
European countries Sweden implemented a 
reference price system in 1993 but abolished 
it in 2002. Nonetheless, within the system for 
generic substitution substitutable medicines 
are grouped together, and a price which is 
lower or the same as the highest price within 
a group of substitutable medicine is accep-
ted without further investigation. This po-
licy measure is supplemented by mandatory 
generic substitution. Experts from Sweden 
attribute savings in pharmaceutical expen-
diture to their generic policies, especially to 
the mandatory generic substitution [10]. A 
lesson learned from the Swedish action could 
be that policy measures should not just be 
implemented somehow but they need to be 
enforced. Enforcement appears to be parti-
cularly relevant for generic substitution and 
INN prescribing since countries having in-
troduced these measures in a mandatory way 
tend to have higher generics uptake than tho-
se with indicative generic substitution and/or 
INN prescribing [15]. While INN prescribing 
and/or generic substitution is still implemen-
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highest price difference amounting to more 
than 70%), and generic prices of the selected 
molecules are in the lower and middle field 
among the sixteen countries analyzed.
Whereas the discussion of the results at a 
country per country basis allows lessons to be 
learned about successful and less successful 
approaches in enhancing generics uptake, no 
correlations could be found at an overall le-
vel: It could neither be proven that countries 
with high price differences had consistently 
low generic prices nor that high price diffe-
rences were a feature of advanced generic 
markets. This corresponds to results of a 
study investigating the relationship between 
generics market shares and the change of ge-
neric prices over time: It identified different 
extents of price decreases in the low and high 
generics market share countries [57].
While price data from the PPI service are 
considered as of good quality, and the infor-
mation on policy measures is up-dated and 
should be as complete as possible, limitations 
regarding the generics market share do exist. 
Though based on a common definition, data 
on generics market shares were provided by 
country representatives from competent au-
thorities and not by the market players, and 
they might include some inconsistencies 
with regard to the definition. Additionally, 
some generics market share data do not re-
fer to 2009 but to previous years. The author 
considered taking the generics market shares 
provided by the European Generics Associa-
tion, but decided against it since published 
information dates back to the year 2006.
The extent of the price differences might 
also be impacted by the different time pe-
riods which had passed since patent expiry. 
However, since the author had no access to 
the exact patent expiry dates of the molecules 
of the study, such analysis could not be per-
formed. Another limitation is the rather small 
sample of products. The limited size of the 
sample is also due to the fact that it was hard 
to identify identical – or at least comparable – 
presentations of the originator and the generic 
product in a reasonable number of countries. 
The author initially checked a sample of a to-
tal of 22 medicines with a generic alternative 
in at least one country derived from the PPI 
service. For the reasons described in the me-
thodology section only five molecules were 
eligible for the analysis. With the on-going 
expiry of patents the analysis might be repe-
ated in future with a broader product sample.
CONCLUSIONS
Even if this research is illustrative and not 
representative due to the small sample, the 
price reductions for the molecules under the 
preference price policy [47].
The UK contributes its high generics market 
shares to INN prescribing which is not man-
datory but highly encouraged. It has neither a 
reference price system nor generic substitu-
tion; the government decided against the in-
troduction of generic substitution planned for 
2010 following a public consultation [15]. 
For the five molecules studied, high price dif-
ferences (more than 90%) were identified in 
case of only two molecules, and for those the 
generic prices were low as well. For the other 
molecules analyzed, however, the differen-
ces were moderate and even low, and generic 
prices ranked in the middle and upper field 
(Figure 2). Studies criticized that the British 
National Health Service paid too high gene-
ric prices in the UK [48,49].
The situation appears similar for Germany for 
which results are only available for three mo-
lecules: Germany is known for a strong com-
petitive generics market, based on a reference 
price system which provides broad reference 
groups in which even original products may 
be clustered as alternatives [6], and it has an 
advanced generics market (Figure 3). But the 
extent of the price differences was rather low, 
and generic prices were in the middle and 
upper field. This is in line with other price 
comparisons in Europe which showed rather 
high generic prices [20,21] and high origina-
tor prices in Germany [21]. Given the broad 
use of external price referencing in the nearly 
all other European countries, pharmaceutical 
industry was incentivized to first launch a 
medicine in Germany because, till recently, 
the country had a free pricing policy [50]. 
Having said that about Germany’s high price 
level, it should be reminded that the prices of 
medicines which are reimbursed by sickness 
funds are in fact lower due to discount agree-
ments with the sickness funds [51-53].
Last but not least, Portugal deserves some di-
scussion. Portugal has been working for more 
than a decade on promoting its generics mar-
ket [6,54,55], but it has not always achieved 
the results envisaged. Till 2010, the generics 
market share in value used to be higher than 
the one in volume [56] which is an indication 
of excess generic prices. For years Portugal 
had defined the reference price equivalent to 
the highest priced generic in the reference 
group [15]. In 2010 policy makers decided to 
reset the price to the average of the five lo-
west priced medicines, and, also in response 
to the global financial crisis, strengthened its 
efforts on enforcing generics policies [16]. As 
the results illustrate, with regard to the price 
differences Portugal ranks middle (in the 
one case of gemcitabine it even displays the 
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study allows drawing some tentative conclu-
sions. The results suggest some pattern for the 
European countries. Countries with strong 
generic policies (e.g. Denmark, Sweden), 
based on competition and involving enfor-
cement (e.g. mandatory generic substitution 
and/or INN prescribing), tend to have higher 
differences between originator and generic 
prices and lower generic prices. Other high 
generics market countries such as the UK, the 
Netherlands or Germany did not necessarily 
show considerable price differences, nor did 
their generic prices rank in the lower field.
The study results confirm that investments 
in generic policies tend to pay off. Howe-
ver, as the country examples highlighted, it 
is not sufficient to launch generic policies to 
enhance generic competition but the measu-
res should be carefully designed and should 
involve elements of enforcement as well as 
monitoring and evaluation. Policy makers 
are encouraged to reconsider existing gene-
ric policies and to reflect on their design and 
implementation.
Further research is recommended. In particu-
lar, with the expiry of further patents the stu-
dy should be repeated with a broader basket 
of products.
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